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SALE OF CONDOMINIUM UNITS
COVERED BY DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS OF INTERSTATE
LAND SALES
FULL DISCLOSURE ACT
In N & C Properties v. Pritchard, 525 So. 2d 1346
(Ala. 1988), cert. denied, -U.S. ., 109 S.Ct. 146
(1988), the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether the sale of condominium units is
covered by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, ("ILSFDA" or "the Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§
1701-1720 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The court determined that the Act does apply to condominium unit sales. Furthermore, the court held that
the exemptions from the disclosure provisions
of the Act claimed by the appellant developers
were unavailable.
Background
Charles Pritchard, Alton Foster, and Donald
and Kathy Johnson ("buyers") purchased condominium units in a project called East Pass
Towers in Florida. The buyers entered into preconstruction purchase agreements with N & C
Properties ("N & C"), and for security, they deposited three letters of credit with N & C, each
with a value of approximately $30,000. Although
the buyers later tried to enjoin the funding of
the letters of credit, the letters eventually were
funded.
The buyers sued N & C, Chancellor Land
Company, Inc., and Neda, Inc. ("developers") in
the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County pursuant to the ILSFDA for failing to provide the disclosure documents required under § 1703 of the
Act. That section makes it unlawful for a developer to sell or to lease any non-exempt lot without providing the buyer with a printed prospectus or property report. The same provision of the
Act requires that the prospectus disclose specific information regarding the developer and
the development project, including a description of the land, the names and addresses of all
owners and promoters, the range of selling
prices, disclosure of any encumbrances or easements, and any other relevant information. Disclosure of this information is mandated to ensure that the buyer is fully informed and to
prevent fraud in the sale of subdivided real estate. It was undisputed that no printed prospectus was provided to the buyers.
Both the buyers and the developers moved
for summary judgment. The buyers claimed they
should have received a prospectus, and the
developers contended that sales of condomin-

ium units were not covered by the ILSFDA. The
trial court granted the buyers' motion, and
entered a final judgment in their favor. The court
rescinded the purchase agreements and awarded
the buyers the amount paid as earnest money as
well as attorneys' fees.
On appeal, the developers presented two
principal arguments. First, they argued that the
ILSFDA does not apply to the sale of condominium units. Second, they argued that even if the
Act does apply to those sales, the offering in
question was for fewer than 100 units and therefore was exempt under § 1702(b)(1) of the Act.
The Supreme Court of Alabama rejected both
arguments and affirmed the circuit court's
decision.
The Opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama
Because the Act requires that a prospectus be
provided when any non-exempt lot is sold or
leased, the-court first had to determine whether
in fact a condominium unit is a "lot" under the
ILSFDA. In making that determination, the court
relied heavily on the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Winter v. Hollingsworth Properties, 777 F.2d
1444 (11th Cir. 1985). Similarly presented with the
issue of the applicability of the ILSFDA to condominium sales, the court in Winter held that
condominium units were lots under the ILSFDA.
The Winter court recognized that the Act is
similar to the Securities Act of 1933 in requiring
disclosure as a means of preventing investor or
consumer fraud. In Winter, the court noted that
although "lot" is not defined in the Act, and
although the Act may have been geared in large
part toward the sale of raw land, Congress did in
fact make the Act applicable to all lots, and
exempted only certain forms of improved land.
The Winter court also noted that the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development had stated
that application of the ILSFDA to condominium
sales was consistent with Congressional intent
and the statutory scheme. Moreover, during
rule-making, the Secretary had defined "lot" as
"any portion, piece, division, unit, or undivided
interest in land...." 777 F.2d at 1447, quoting 24
C.F.R. § 1710.1 (1985). The Wintercourt thus considered it clear that the term "lot" covers condominium units.
Accepting this reasoning, the Supreme Court
of Alabama also held that condominium units
are lots under the Act. The court stated that the
Act specifically exempts from the disclosure
requirement the sale or lease of improved land
on which a condominium building exists or on

which one must be built within two years; such a
specific exemption would be redundant if the
Act did not as a general matter apply to condominium sale or lease.
The court also rejected the developers' second contention, that even if the ILSFDA did
apply to the sale of condominium units the
offering was exempt under § 1702(b)(1) of the
Act. That section exempts from the disclosure
provisions any offering of fewer than 100 lots.
The East Pass Towers development was to be
offered in two phases, I and II. The buyers purchased in Phase I, which contained 55 units.
Phase II was to contain 46 units. The developers
contended that because Phase II was never formally offered for sale, and because no condominium documents covering Phase II had been
drafted, construction of Phase II was optional
and unrelated to Phase I. The developers concluded that the offering was for 55 units and
therefore exempt.
The buyers argued that the two phases were
part of a common promotional plan. If so, the
development contained 101 units and was covered by the Act. The court agreed, and concluded that the development of Phase II was
presumed to be part of a common plan with
Phase I. In reaching its decision, the court relied
upon the Act's definitions of "offer," "subdivision," and "common promotional plan" as applied to the facts of the case.
The buyer pointed to sworn testimony that
the role of Neda, Inc., was to advertise and sell
units in both Phases, and that the project was
presented by the developers as a dual phase
project consisting of two adjoining towers and
containing over 100 units. Furthermore, there
was testimony to the effect that the president of
Chancellor Land Company, Inc., told the Johnsons that they could trade their Phase I unit for a
nicer unit in Phase II when it was completed.
Finally, a prospectus prepared by the developers

(but not given to the buyers before sale) gave
the general impression that, although the developers had reserved the right to build Phase II at
their discretion, the ultimate form of East Pass
Towers would be a twin tower development.
The court cited Grove Towers v. Lopez, 467
So.2d 358 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 480 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1985), for the proposition that an option not to build all of a planned
development is an insufficient basis for a claim
of an exemption from the Act's disclosure requirements. Next, the court noted that § 1701(11)
of the Act defines "offer" as any inducement,
solicitation, or attempt to encourage an individual to acquire a lot in a subdivision, and that
§1701(3) defines "subdivision" as land divided
into lots for the purpose of sale or lease as part of
a common promotional plan. Section 1701(4)
defines "common promotional plan" as any
plan in which land is known or advertised by a
common name, regardless of the number of lots
included in any offering.
In light of Grove Towers, the statutory definitions, and the developers' representations, the
court held that Phases I and II could not be
separated. The offering thus was not exempt
from coverage under the Act. Accordingly, the
developers unlawfully sold the units when they
did so without providing a prospectus to each
buyer prior to execution of the sales agreements.
Finally, the developers argued that the buyers
intended to resell the units, thereby exempting
the developers from the Act's disclosure requirements under § 1702(a)(7) of the Act. The court
rejected this contention because the developers
had produced no evidence of such intent on the
buyers' part, and the regulations covering exemptions under the Act require the developer
who wishes to claim an exemption to maintain
records showing the exemption's prerequisites
are satisfied. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.4(d) (1988).
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